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NOTE
Do I Own This Car? The Supreme Court
Creates a Standard for BAPCPA
Car Ownership
Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011).
ANNE BENTON HUCKER*
1. INTRODUCTION
On Monday, October 4, 2010, reporters and other observers packed the
red upholstered benches and filled the white marble courtroom of the United
States Supreme Court.' They came to witness a newsworthy event - the first
day of the Court's new Term and, more importantly, Justice Elena Kagan's
first day on the job.2 The Court opened the Term with a fairly routine case,
the type of "workaday dispute that makes up far more of the docket than the
constitutional barnburners the [J]ustices occasionally entertain."3 This first
case of the Term would be the subject matter of Justice Kagan's first opin-
*4ion.4
The case was Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., and the dispute was
whether, under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Appellant Jason Ransom should be able to claim a
vehicle ownership expense for purposes of Chapter 13 bankruptcy for the
unencumbered car that he owned. Practitioners in the bankruptcy field had
been watching the progression of this case and were eager to learn the Court's
* B.A., University of Virginia, 2004; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri
School of Law, 2012; Senior Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2011-12.
This article is in memory of my parents, Linda Foister and Charles Hucker, the finest
writers I know.
1. Joan Biskupic, Justices Resume Routine Like They Don Robes, USA TODAY,
Oct. 5, 2010, at 5A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/judi
cial/2010-10-04-supreme-court-first-day-kaganN.htm.
2. Id.
3. Jess Bravin, On Her First Day, Justice Kagan Dives into the Fray, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Oct. 4, 2010, 3:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/10/04/on-her-first-
day-justice-kagan-dives-into-the-fray/.
4. Jess Bravin, Justice Kagan Pens First Opinion, an 8-1 Win for Credit Card
Companies, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011, 4:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/20 11/01/11 /justice-kagan-pens-first-opinion-an-8-1-win-for-credit-card-
companies/.
5. 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011).
1
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resolution of the issue. The interest was due to two reasons. First, the out-
come of the case would affect approximately 250,000 Chapter 13 petitioners.
Second, the case would resolve an issue on which the lower courts had not
8been able to reach a consensus.
BAPCPA was "poorly crafted" and "hastily designed," leaving one
bankruptcy judge to lament that
"those responsible for . . . passing [BAPCPA] . . . did all in their
power to avoid the proffered input from sitting United States Bank-
ruptcy Judges, various professors of bankruptcy law at distin-
guished universities, and many professional associations filled with
the ... bankruptcy lawyers in the country as to the perceived flaws
in the Act."9
Another bankruptcy judge complained that the law was
"[u]nquestionably . . . the most poorly written piece of legislation that I or
anyone else has ever seen . . . . No one has ever seen a piece of garbage like
this .... There's going to be the most fantastic anarchy in bankruptcy courts
for years."10
6. See, e.g., Elena Kagan Gives First Opinion as a Supreme Court Justice,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-Ne
ws-Wires/20 11/0111 /Elena-Kagan-gives-first-opinion-as-a-Supreme-Court-Justice;
Laura Fishman, Ownership Costs Cannot Be Deducted Without Making Car Payment,
PHOENIX BANKR. L. NEWS (Jan. 13, 2011, 12:54 PM), http://phoenixbankruptcyn
ews.com/2011/01 /ownership-costs-cannot-be-deducted-without-making-car-payment.
html; Bill Rochelle, Auto Deductions, Tousa, Tribune, Lehman: Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:29 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-
05/car-deduction-tousa-tribune-international-garden-loehmann-bankruptcy.html; Nina
Totenberg, Supreme Court Rules in Bankruptcy Case, NPR (Jan. 11, 2011), http:
//www.npr.org/2011/01/11/132843108/kagan-writes-first-opinion-in-bankruptcy-case.
7. Bankruptcy Experts Discuss Supreme Court's Ruling in Ransom v. FIA Card
Services and Its Effect on "Projected Disposable Income" for Chapter 13 Debtors,
AM. BANKR. INST. (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.abiworld.org/webinars/201 1/Ransom_
FIA/index.html [hereinafter Bankruptcy Experts].
8. eCast Settlement Corp. v. Washburn, 579 F.3d 934, 936-37 (8th Cir. 2009);
Tate v. Bolen, 571 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2009); Ross-Tousey v. Neary, 549 F.3d 1148,
1156-57 (7th Cir. 2008).
9. Steve Jakubowski, Justice Scalia Won't "Ransom" His Principles to Grant
Justice Kagan a Unanimous First Opinion That Looks to BAPCPA's "Text, Context,




(quoting U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Frank Monroe).
10. Brian J. Rogal, Bankruptcy Law in Shambles, IN THESE TIMES, June 5, 2006
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When the Court issued its opinion, holding that Ransom could not claim
a vehicle ownership expense if he owned an unencumbered car, Justice Ka-
gan created a tidy framework through which to interpret all future BAPCPA
provisions: to determine the meaning of the statute, one must look at the text,
context, and purpose of BAPCPA.i1
But Justice Antonin Scalia refused to overlook the manifest problems
with BAPCPA's construction, and thus, he dissented.12 In his dissent, he
contended that Justice Kagan's opinion was simplistic and that it glossed over
BAPCPA's real issues.' 3 He argued that the Court's opinion in Ransom cre-
ated more questions than it answered.14
1I. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 5, 2006, Jason Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada.' 5 Ransom had
accrued $82,542.93 in unsecured debt, including $32,896.73 that Ransom
owed to MBNA American Bank (MBNA).16 During the process of filing for
bankruptcy, Ransom completed Form B22C, which is the Debtor's Statement
of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period and Dis-
posable Income.17 On this form, Ransom reported his monthly income of
$4248.56 and his annual income of $50,982.72.8 At the time, the median
income for a single-family household in Nevada was $38,506.19 Because
Ransom's income exceeded the median income for Nevada, the bankruptcy
code required Ransom to create a five-year payment plan.20
The bankruptcy code instructs debtors such as Ransom to deduct report-
ed monthly expenses from the debtors' reported monthly income to determine
the amount which will be repaid to creditors.21 The bankruptcy code allows
several categories of potential expenses, including household expenses, car
expenses, and utility expenses. 22 For certain categories, such as car expenses,
11. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2011).
12. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 732-33.
14. See id. at 730-33.




19. Census Bureau Median Family Income by Family Size (in 2005 Inflation-
Adjusted Dollars), U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ust/eolbapcpa/
20060213/bcidata/median income table.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
20. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15, at 28a.
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
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the bankruptcy code instructs debtors to use Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
Standards to establish the allowable expense amounts.23 Specifically, the IRS
provides that a debtor can be eligible for ownership and operating costs with
24
respect to a motor vehicle. After a debtor calculates his expenses, he sub-
tracts these expenses from his monthly income.25 The surplus is the amount
that the debtor is able to pay each month to his creditors in his payment
plan.26
At the time of Ransom's bankruptcy filing, he owned a 2004 Toyota
Camry outright, with no liens or security interests.27 Ransom calculated his
monthly expenses using the IRS Standards in accordance with the bankruptcy
code. 2 8 For his 2004 Toyota Camry, Ransom listed ownership and operating
costs as reported monthly expenses.29 After calculating these expenses, to-
gether with his other expenses, he deducted this amount from his reported
monthly income, which resulted in approximately $500 of net income per
month.30 Thus, Ransom filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan in which he
would pay creditors $500 per month for five years.31
The trustee of Ransom's bankruptcy case and MBNA contested the plan
and filed motions in opposition to the plan, arguing that the court should pro-
hibit Ransom from taking an ownership expense for a vehicle that he owned
in full. 32 The bankruptcy court found in favor of the trustee and MBNA,
holding that an ownership expense is not appropriate if the debtor is not mak-
ing any car payments. 33
Ransom appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling to the bankruptcy appel-
34late panel. While the bankruptcy appellate panel acknowledged that many
courts had found that a debtor could deduct an ownership expense even if the
debtor owned an unencumbered car, the bankruptcy appellate panel noted that
many other courts had prohibited debtors from deducting an ownership ex-
pense in that situation.3 5 The bankruptcy appellate panel found the latter line
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%2OForms%201210/B
22A_1210.pdf.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. Notably, the IRS Standards are not meant for use in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. See infra Part V.B.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i); see Bankruptcy Form 22A (Chapter 7), Part VI,
p. 8, line 49.
26. See Bankruptcy Form 22A (Chapter 7), Part VI, p. 8, line 50.
27. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 15, at 5.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6-7.
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of cases more persuasive; consequently, it affirmed the bankruptcy court's
36decision.
Ransom appealed the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision to the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.37 In a unanimous opinion,
the court affirmed the bankruptcy appellate panel's ruling, holding that debt-
ors do not have applicable ownership expenses if they are not making loan or
lease payments on the car.38 The court reached this holding by defining the
term "applicable" as "capable of or suitable for being applied."3 9 Next, the
court determined that "applicable" modified the phrase "monthly expense
amounts."40 Consequently, a vehicle ownership expense could become "ca-
pable of being applied" only when the debtor had an actual vehicle ownership
expense.41 Otherwise, the court reasoned, the term "applicable" would be
meaningless.42
Ransom appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the United States Su-
preme Court, which affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling.43 In an eight-to-one
decision, the United States Supreme Court held that based on the "text, con-
text, and purpose" of the statutory language regarding vehicle expenses, a
debtor could not take a vehicle ownership deduction if that debtor was not
making loan or lease payments."
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Scholars believe that the term "bankruptcy" comes from an Italian
phrase, banco rotto, referring to a merchant's "broken bench."45 The phrase
described the common Italian practice of merchants selling their goods and
46products from benches. When merchants were unable to pay their obliga-
36. Id.
37. Id
38. Ransom v. MBNA, Am. Bank, N.A., 577 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (9th Cir.
2009), aff'dsub nom. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011).
39. Id at 1031 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60




43. Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 723.
44. See id. at 720-21.
45. Robert J. Landry, III & Nancy Hisey Mardis, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform:
Debtors'Prison Without Bars or "Just Desserts"for Deadbeats?, 36 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 91, 118 (2006); see Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter II
Reorganization Remain A Viable Option for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-
First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 155 (2004).
46. Uriel Rabinovitz, Toward Effective Implementation of II U.S.C. §
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tions, their creditors would take possession of the merchant's goods and
would break the merchant's bench to prevent the merchant from selling
goods.47 While creditors were able to punish insolvent debtors, this Italian
practice also left merchants unable to earn a living.48
Since its inception, bankruptcy law has struggled to balance the compet-
ing concerns of creditors and of debtors. 49 Legislation has vacillated from
favoring one group to favoring the other group.50 For many decades, the
bankruptcy code strongly favored debtors, leading to loud complaints from
the creditor community. 5 With the enactment of BAPCPA, the pendulum
swung back in favor of creditors.52 Despite this victory for creditors,
BAPCPA has created turmoil for all the parties involved in the bankruptcy
53process.
A. The Beginnings ofBankruptcy Laws in America
Because the flow of commerce always has required a solution to deal
with unsuccessful businesses and individuals, America's founding fathers
considered bankruptcy laws when they drafted the Constitution. 54 The draft-
ers viewed bankruptcy as an important tool in handling business and personal
financial failures.55 In particular, James Madison wrote in Federalist Paper
42 that the creation of "uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected
with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the
parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the
expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question., 56 Consequently,
the drafters of the Constitution included the Bankruptcy Clause, which stated
that Congress had the power to pass "uniform Laws on the subject of Bank-
,,57
ruptcies.
In the late eighteenth century, an economic panic swept across the
young nation. Calls for a federal bankruptcy law rang out across the coun-
try.59 Congress responded by passing the United States's first bankruptcy
47. Id.
48. Miller & Waisman, supra note 45, at 155.
49. See infra Part 1I.A-D.
50. See infra Part Ill.A-D.
51. See infra Part Ill.A-C.
52. See infra Part I.D.
53. See eCast Settlement Corp. v. Washburn, 579 F.3d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 2009);
Tate v. Bolen, 571 F.3d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 2009); Ross-Tousey v. Neary, 549 F.3d
1148, 1156-57 (7th Cir. 2008).
54. Rabinovitz, supra note 46, at 1527; see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
55. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
56. Id.
57. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss4/8
CAR OWNERSHIP EXPENSES UNDER BAPCPA
law, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800.60 Congress passed the law with the goal of
helping creditors maximize their recovery, not ensuring that debtors received
a fresh start.61 Notably, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 authorized only involun-
tary bankruptcy proceedings.62 As the economy stabilized, much of the
American public no longer saw the need for bankruptcy legislation. Conse-
quently, Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 just three years after
passing it.6 This cycle - financial panic, passage of a bankruptcy law, eco-
nomic stabilization, and eventual repeal of the bankruptcy law - occurred two
more times in the mid-nineteenth century, with the Bankruptcy Acts of 1841
and 1867.65
B. Lasting Change for the Bankruptcy System
At the end of the nineteenth century, the American economy underwent
66
rapid expansion, due in large part to the booming railroad industry. The
United States "had become a commercial nation once and for all," and conse-
quently, its leaders recognized the need for permanent federal bankruptcy
legislation.67 Thus, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
While pro-creditor groups had lobbied for the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
pro-debtor groups lobbied for and obtained debtor-friendly changes in the
legislation.69 Despite the thriving commercial activity at the end of the nine-
teenth century, many Americans faced a fragile financial future because of
the rapidly changing economy.70 Consequently, legislators who represented
farmers and small merchants advocated for debtor-friendly bankruptcy
laws. ' The most important victory for these legislators was the inclusion of
72
voluntary bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. In essence, voluntary
bankruptcy meant that debtors could file for bankruptcy when creditors were
attempting to enforce their obligations, instead of "leaving the power exclu-
60. Rabinovitz, supra note 46, at 1528.
61. Id. at 1528-29.
62. Id. at 1529.
63. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 15 (1995); John Fabian Witt, Narrating Bank-
ruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 314-315 (2003).
64. Witt, supra note 63, at 314.
65. See Tabb, supra note 63, at 16-21.
66. See Miller & Waisman, supra note 45, at 160.
67. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV.
J. 321, 325 (1999).
68. Id. at 322.
69. Id at 325.
70. Id. at 333.
7 1. Id.
72. Lauren Goldberg, Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collec-
tion After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 715 (2006).
2011] 1245
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sively to creditors."73 Hence, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 started the trend of
American bankruptcy law favoring the debtor.
Moreover, unlike the three previous federal bankruptcy laws, which
Congress repealed shortly after their enactment, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
remained in effect until 1978 due to party politics and the creation of the
bankruptcy bar.74 When Congress enacted the 1898 Act the Republican Party
controlled Congress and remained in power for more than a decade.7 1 This
control lasted long enough "for the bankruptcy bar to get on its feet."76 When
the Republicans lost control of Congress in 1910, "the bankruptcy ... bar that
owed [its] existence to the Act [was] now in a position to help make sure that
the Act was not repealed." 77
The 1898 Act created much of the modem bankruptcy system, which is
comprised of nine chapters in the United States Code. Specifically, under
Chapter 7, a debtor liquidates her assets and discharges her remaining debts. 79
Under Chapter 13, a debtor may keep most of her assets but must adhere to
the terms of a court-approved payment plan, through which her creditors re-
ceive monthly payments.80 After the payment plan concludes, the debtor may
discharge her remaining debts.
C. Fundamental Overhaul in the Twentieth Century
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 remained the governing law for bankruptcy
proceedings for more than eighty years, but "[b]y the 1970s, the creaky con-
struct of the 1898 Act was ripe for overhaul."82 As personal bankruptcy fil-
ings skyrocketed during the 1950s and 1960s, the creditor industry pushed for
83bankruptcy reform. In 1970, Congress responded to this effort by creating
the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. 84 This Com-
mission was authorized to study and make recommendations on existing
85bankruptcy law. The findings of the Commission led to the enactment of
73. Id.
74. Skeel, supra note 67, at 337; The History of Bankruptcy, IHATEDEBT.COM,
http://ihatedebt.com/DealingWithYourMoney/ThePathsOutofDebt/TheHistory of B
ankruptcy.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
75. Skeel, supra note 67, at 337.
76. Id. at 338.
77. Id.
78. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
79. Id. §§ 701-84.
80. See id. §§ 1301-30 (2006).
81. Id. § 1328.
82. Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in Armer-
ica, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2016, 2020 (2003).
83. Id.
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the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which replaced the Bankruptcy Act of
1898.86
Although the creditor community instigated the 1978 Act, the bankrupt-
cy bar and pro-debtor groups "seized the reins of the reform effort."87 The
final result was debtor-friendly bankruptcy legislation. For example, the
1978 legislation encouraged greater use of Chapter 13, yet Congress prohib-
ited creditors from seeking involuntary Chapter 13 cases.89 Additionally, if a
debtor chose to participate in a Chapter 13 proceeding instead of a Chapter 7
liquidation proceeding, Congress provided a "super discharge" of certain
debts that would not have been dischargeable in a liquidation proceeding. 90
Thus, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 fundamentally changed the Amer-
ican bankruptcy system. The 1978 Act resulted in the dramatic increase in
personal bankruptcy filings from 300,000 in 1980 to 1,500,000 million in
2002.9'
D. The Enactment ofBAPCPA
As personal bankruptcy filings continued to rise throughout the late
1990s, the credit industry made repeated attempts to overhaul bankruptcy
legislation in its favor.92 Pro-creditor groups believed that individuals not
only abused the bankruptcy system, but that many individuals could pay more
of their debts than they were paying in Chapter 7 bankruptcies.93
In 2005, the credit industry achieved its goal of stricter bankruptcy legis-
lation when Congress overwhelmingly passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven-
tion and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).94 The cornerstone of
this legislation was the "means test," which ensures "that debtors will pay
creditors the maximum that they are able to afford."95
86. Id.
87. Zywicki, supra note 82, at 2020.
88. Tabb, supra note 63, at 35 (referring to Chapter 13 as "the mode of relief
allowing for the readjustment of the debts of individuals with regular income").
89. Id.
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. Zywicki, supra note 82, at 2021.
92. See id. at 2032-33.
93. See Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding
on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 457, 458-59 (2005); Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485,
565 (2005).
94. See Jensen, supra note 93, at 565.
95. Rabinovitz, supra note 46, at 1531 (internal quotation marks omitted).
2011] 1247
9
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The means test applies to Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcies. For
a Chapter 7 filing, the means test determines whether a debtor is eligible for a
liquidation proceeding. 97 For a Chapter 13 filing, the means test determines
the amount that a debtor is able to pay her creditors each month by subtract-
ing "amounts reasonably necessary to be expended" for the support of the
debtor and her dependents from the debtor's income.98 These reasonably
necessary expenses are "the debtor's applicable monthly expense amounts
specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's
actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Ex-
penses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debt-
or resides." 99
The IRS National and Local Standards, found in the Internal Revenue
Manual, delineate the applicable monthly expenses.i00 The IRS uses these
standards when creating a repayment plan for taxpayers. 01 Specifically, the-
se standards represent the amounts necessary to provide for a taxpayer and
her family's living expenses.102 The IRS created the National and Local
Standards for allowable expenses to establish consistency in how much the
IRS requires taxpayers to repay.' 03 When determining if a taxpayer may have
an allowable expense, the IRS limits the taxpayer "to the lesser of actual ex-
penses or the local standard" but gives the taxpayer the National Standard
amount even if it is greater than the taxpayer's actual expenses.3 ' The Local
Standards list several allowable expense categories.10 5 One of these catego-
ries includes expenses related to car ownership.106 The IRS would allow a
taxpayer to take the lesser of his actual car ownership expense or the local
standard for the car ownership expense.'o7 Consequently, if a taxpayer does
96. Chelsey W. Tulis, Note, Get Real: Reframing the Debate over How to Calcu-
late Projected Disposable Income in § 1325(B), 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 345, 353-54
(2009).
97. See id. at 353.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
99. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(1) (Supp. IV 2010).
100. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL pt. 5, ch. 15,
§ 1.8-.9 [hereinafter IRS MANUAL], available at http://www.irs.gov/irn/part5/irm_05
-015-001.html#doel012 (last visited Oct. 3, 2011).
101. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 154 (6th ed. 2009).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 154-55.
104. Id. at 155.
105. See IRS MANUAL, supra note 100, pt. 5, ch. 15 § 1.9.
106. Id.
107. Collection Financial Standards, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.
irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96543,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
1248
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not have a car ownership expense - which the IRS defines as a loan or lease
paymentios - then the taxpayer may not claim a car ownership expense.
Observers roundly criticized the draftsmanship of BAPCPA. Specifical-
ly, commentators noted that "a number of provisions of the amendments were
inartfully drafted, revealing that the drafters were not well acquainted with
their subject and they refused expert help."l 09 The problems with BAPCPA's
statutory construction have created interpretation issues for the courts."10
Notably, these problems have arisen in the allowance or disallowance of a car
ownership expense.
However, since the enactment of the BAPCPA, the circuit courts of ap-
peals had been split as to whether a debtor could take an ownership cost for a
car that was paid in full.112 In Ross-Tousey v. Neary, the Seventh Circuit
addressed the issue and based its ruling on three main points.'' 3 First, the
court held that because the word "applicable" was used with respect to Local
Standard Expenses, while the word "actual" was used with respect to Other
Necessary Expenses, Congress must not have intended the words "applica-
ble" and "actual" to mean the same thing in the statute.1 4 Second, the court
decided that the word "applicable" in "applicable monthly expense amounts"
referred to the predetermined amount in the Local Standards that applied to
the debtor's specific circumstances." 5 Finally, the court reasoned that own-
ership costs of a car included more than loan or lease payments, including
"depreciation, insurance, licensing fees and taxes."" 6 Consequently, a debtor
who owned an unencumbered car would be eligible to claim a vehicle owner-
ship expense." 7 After the Seventh Circuit decided Ross-Tousey, the Fifth
108. See IRS MANUAL, supra note 100, pt. 5, ch. 15 § 1.7.4.B.
109. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 101, at 106.
110. See, e.g., In re Attorneys at Law and Debt Relief Agencies, 353 B.R. 318,
321 (S.D. Ga. 2006) (interpreting the definition of "debt relief agencies"); In re
Lopez, 350 B.R 868 870-71 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (interpreting compensation of
the trustee under BAPCPA), aff'd sub nom. Cohen v. Lopez, 372 B.R. 40 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2007).
111. See, e.g., eCast Settlement Corp. v. Washburn, 579 F.3d 934, 939-40 (8th
Cir. 2009); Tate v. Bolen, 571 F.3d 423, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2009); Ross-Tousey v.
Neary, 549 F.3d 1148, 1156-57 (7th Cir. 2008).
112. Compare eCast Settlement Corp., 579 F.3d at 935 (holding that a debtor can
deduct an ownership cost for a vehicle, regardless of whether the debtor has an actual
monthly vehicle ownership expense), and Tate, 571 F.3d 423, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2009)
(same), andRoss-Tousey, 549 F.3d at 1156-57 (same), with Ransom v. MBNA, Am.
Bank, N.A., 577 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a debtor may not de-
duct an ownership cost for a vehicle without an actual ownership expense), aff'd sub
nom. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011).
113. Ross-Tousey, 549 F.3d at 1160.
114. Id. at 1158.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1160.
117. Id. at 1161.
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Circuit in Tate v. Bolen and the Eighth Circuit in eCast Settlement Corp. v.
Washburn followed suit, using the same reasoning.118
The Ninth Circuit took an approach different from the other circuit
courts. The court determined that the word "applicable" in "applicable
monthly expenses" meant "capable of or suitable for being applied."' 1 9 Con-
sequently, a vehicle ownership expense was capable of being applied only
when the debtor had an actual expense.' 20 Therefore, the court concluded that
if a vehicle ownership cost does not exist, then a deductible expense also does
not exist.121
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Writing for an eight-member majority, Justice Kagan began the Court's
opinion in Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A. by reciting the purposes of
BAPCPA, namely, that the legislation was meant "to correct perceived abuses
of the bankruptcy system" and "to help ensure that debtors who can pay cred-
itors do pay them."l 22 The Court explained that BAPCPA created the means
test to achieve these purposes.123
The Court determined that the dispositive issue in Ransom was whether
a debtor who owned an unencumbered vehicle could deduct the vehicle own-
ership cost as an "applicable" monthly expense.124 The Court found that the
answer to this question turned on the definition of the term "applicable." 25
In deciding what the term "applicable" meant with respect to BAPCPA, the
Court looked to the text of the statutory language, the context of the statute,
and the purposes of BAPCPA.126
First, the Court looked to the ordinary meaning of the word "applica-
ble." 27 The majority did so by consulting Webster's Third New International
Dictionary, concluding the definition of the term "applicable" was "appropri-
118. eCast Settlement Corp. v. Washburn, 579 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir. 2009); Tate
v. Bolen, 571 F.3d 423, 426-28 (5th Cir. 2009).
119. Ransom v. MBNA, Am. Bank, N.A., 577 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted) (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 60 (11th
ed. 2005)), affd sub nom. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716 (2011).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 721 (emphasis removed) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
123. Id. at 721-22.
124. Id. at 721, 724.
125. Id. at 724.
126. Id. at 724-25.
127. Id. at 724.
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ate, relevant, suitable, or fit." 28 Given this definition, the Court reasoned that
a monthly expense amount was applicable only if that amount was relevant to
that specific debtor's financial situation.129 Accordingly, the Court ruled that
a debtor may claim a vehicle ownership expense but only if that expense is
relevant to the debtor.130 The Court maintained that a vehicle ownership ex-
pense is relevant to a debtor only if that debtor has actual costs - either in a
loan or lease payment - in that category.'M
Next, the Court looked to the statutory context of BAPCPA.132 The
Court held that the context supported its definition of "applicable." 33 Specif-
ically, the Court established that "[b]ecause Congress intended the means test
to approximate the debtor's reasonable expenditures on essential items, a
debtor should be required to qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an
expense in the relevant category."' 34 The Court concluded that an amount is
not reasonably necessary if the debtor does not incur the expense.135
Finally, the Court held that the purposes of BAPCPA, namely the twin
goals of establishing a more efficient administration of bankruptcy proceed-
ings and "ensur[ing] that [debtors] repay creditors the maximum they can
afford,"ise supported its definition of "applicable." 37 The Court asserted that
a debtor receiving a deduction for an expense that the debtor does not incur
undermines the purpose of BAPCPA.138
Consequently, the Court held that a debtor cannot claim a vehicle own-
ership expense unless the debtor has that expense. 139 To determine if a debtor
incurred a vehicle ownership expense, the Court analyzed what type of costs
were included in the term.140 To do so, the Court looked to IRS definitions of
two different types of expenses: vehicle ownership expense and vehicle oper-
ating expense.141 The IRS defined vehicle ownership expense as a lease or
loan payment on that vehicle.142 Under the IRS definition, vehicle operating
expense included costs such as insurance, fuel, maintenance, and toll road
payments.143 Because a debtor could account for costs of possessing a car by
128. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 105 (2002)).
129. Id
130. Id
131. Id. at 724-25.
132. Id. at 724.
133. Id
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taking a vehicle operating expense, the Court ruled a vehicle ownership ex-
pense included only loan or lease payments on the vehicle.144 The Court ex-
plained that "[t]he Collection Financial Standards - the IRS's explanatory
guidelines to the National and Local Standards - explicitly recognize this
distinction between ownership and operating costs, making clear that individ-
uals who have a car but make no loan or lease payments may claim only the
operating allowance."l 45
The Court then addressed three arguments that Ransom raised.146 First,
Ransom argued that the Court's definition of "applicable" was incorrect.147
Ransom claimed that the statute uses the term "applicable" only to specify the
categories of allowable expenses in the IRS Local Standards that apply to the
debtor, whether or not the debtor incurs that expense.148 The Court rejected
this view, holding that this definition undermined the text, context, and pur-
pose of BAPCPA. 149 Moreover, the Court ruled that this definition "ren-
der[ed] the term 'applicable' superfluous." 50 The Court held that if it were to
use the definition of "applicable" that Ransom provided, the word only would
be necessary to "direct[] each debtor to the correct box (and associated dollar
amount of deduction) within every table."' 5'
Next, Ransom asserted that the Court's definition of vehicle ownership
expense was too narrow.152 Ransom argued that the bankruptcy code states
that applicable monthly expenses cannot be debts, whereas the IRS defines
ownership costs as debts (loan or lease payments). s3 Thus, Ransom main-
tained that vehicle ownership expense must be something other than loan or
lease payments.154 The Court disagreed, ruling that "any friction between the
two [definitions] likely reflects only a lack of attention" and does not display
congressional intent.
Finally, Ransom made two policy arguments regarding the proper defi-
nition of the terms "applicable" and vehicle ownership expense. 15 First,
Ransom argued that a debtor could time his car payments so there were only
one to two payments remaining, while still claiming the deduction for his
repayment plan.157 The Court dismissed this argument, holding that this type
144. Id. at 725-26.
145. Id. at 726.
146. Id. at 726-29.
147. Id. at 726.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 726-27.
151. Id. at 726.
152. Id. at 728.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 728-29.
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of oddity was inevitable with a standardized test.'5 The Court further ex-
plained that this type of oddity was preferable to the previous case-by-case
determinations that permitted too much abuse.159 Second, Ransom argued
that the Court's definition of "applicable" encouraged people to remain in
debt because if debtors had a car payment then they could take a vehicle
ownership deduction.' 60 The Court replied that the goal of the applicable
deductions was not to influence "any broad federal policy as to saving or
borrowing, the deductions serve merely to ensure that debtors in bankruptcy
can afford essential items."'6 1 While the Court answered all of those ques-
tions, it did not address whether a debtor who had an ownership cost that was
lower than the applicable amount would be entitled to the whole amount or
his or her lesser actual payment.
Therefore, the Court held that because Ransom owned an unencumbered
vehicle, he did not incur an applicable vehicle ownership cost per the IRS
Local Standards.162 Consequently, the vehicle ownership expense was not
applicable to Ransom, and he could not take the deduction.163
B. Justice Antonin Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia dissented from the majority opinion, stating that, while the
Court viewed the IRS interpretations of the National and Local Standards as a
"directive," the IRS interpretations did not bind the Court.16 Justice Scalia
reasoned that the Standards should not be used in the same way with regard to
Chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code solely because the IRS used the National
and Local Standards for revenue collection purposes.165
Justice Scalia further opined that the Court had misinterpreted the mean-
ing of the term "applicable."' 66 Justice Scalia departed from the majority's
analysis in his determination that under BAPCPA, "applicable" did not mean
relevant.167 Instead, he explained that the phrase "according to the applicable
provisions of the attached table" could be expressed just as easily as "accord-
ing to the attached table."' Thus, Justice Scalia argued that the term "appli-
cable" did not have a special meaning within the context of the bankruptcy




161. Id. at 730.
162. Id
163. Id.
164. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 730-31.
166. Id. at 731.
167. Id.
168. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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169to do so. Justice Scalia determined that while each word in a statute must
be given meaning, "[t]he canon against superfluity is not a canon against ver-
bosity."I 70 Moreover, Justice Scalia reasoned that if Congress intended the
word "applicable" to mean relevant for purposes of BAPCPA, then Congress
"would have been most precise to say 'monthly expense amounts specified
under the National Standards and Local Standards, if applicable for IRS col-
lection purposes."i 7 1
Justice Scalia asserted another definition for the term: in his estimation,
"applicable" meant that the debtor claims the predetermined amounts in the
Local Standards that were applicable to the debtor's specific situation.' 72
Specifically, if a debtor owns a car, he should claim an ownership deduc-
tion.173 On the other hand, if a debtor does not own a car, he is not able to
claim an ownership deduction. 174
Finally, Justice Scalia maintained that his definition of "applicable" did
not undermine the purposes of BAPCPA. 17 5 He acknowledged that, while his
definition might create some oddities in specific situations, "in the Court's
own terms, [the] occasional over allowance . . . 'is the inevitable result of a
standardized formula like the means test. . . . Congress chose to tolerate the
occasional peculiarity that a brighter-line test produces."'
1 76
V. COMMENT
A. Immediate Effects on Bankruptcy Proceedings
Since the passage of BAPCPA, courts have muddled through, trying to
interpret the confusing new bankruptcy system provisions.177 The Ransom
decision fundamentally changed the landscape of BAPCPA litigation. Spe-
cifically, the Ransom decision will have three immediate effects. First, Ran-
som will affect the amount of money that debtors will repay their creditors.
Second, the Court's holding will affect findings of "abuse" in Chapter 7
bankruptcy filings. Finally, the Ransom decision will affect the Court's fu-
ture rulings regarding BAPCPA litigation. Each of these effects will be dis-








176. Id (quoting id. at 729 (majority opinion)).
177. Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law, 16
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349,411 (2008).
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1. Debtors Will Pay More Money to Creditors
The most obvious result of Ransom is that debtors will be required to
repay creditors more money; therefore, the decision fulfills one of BAPCPA's
main objectives - ensuring that creditors are repaid as much of their debt as
possible. A debtor can no longer claim a vehicle ownership expense if the
debtor's vehicle does not have any encumbrances.' 79 Because the debtor
cannot take a vehicle ownership expense, the debtor will have one fewer "ap-
plicable monthly expense" under the means test in section 707(b)(2). Ulti-
mately, debtors who would have been able to discharge some of their unse-
cured debts will not be able to do so and, instead, will have more disposable
income to distribute to and repay their creditors. For example, Jason Ransom
now will have to pay his creditors approximately $28,000 more than he
would have had to under his initial repayment plan because he can no longer
claim a vehicle ownership cost. so
The Court's opinion did not address the situation in which a debtor's ac-
tual ownership costs - in the form of either loan or lease payments - differed
from listed amounts in the Local Standards. Actual car ownership costs can
differ from the listed amounts in the Local Standards in two ways.
First, a debtor's actual car ownership costs could be higher than the
amounts listed in the Local Standards. Most car payments are secured
debts, and the bankruptcy code allows debtors to claim the full amount of
secured debt payments as expenses.'82 Thus, the Ransom decision will not
affect the amount debtors can claim for secured car payments that are higher
than the amounts listed in the Local Standards. However, in the unlikely
event that a car payment is unsecured, future courts could find that Ransom
dictates that the amounts listed in the Local Standards are an absolute cap.
Additionally, the Court would not want to reward a debtor who has an expen-
sive car payment by giving the debtor a larger deduction than the Local
Standards allow. 83 Doing otherwise would be contrary to the purpose of
BAPCPA.
Second, a debtor's actual car ownership costs could be lower than the
amounts listed in the Local Standards. Future courts likely will not limit the
logic that underlies the Ransom decision to debtors who have unencumbered
cars. Specifically, a debtor who owns an encumbered car, but the monthly
lease or loan payment is less than the current $496 allowed by the IRS Local
Standards, likely will be prohibited from taking the full $496 deduction.
178. Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 725.
179. Id. at 730.
180. Id. at 723.
181. See Bankruptcy, VERONA L. GROUP P.A., http://www.veronalawgroup.com/
practiceareas_pages/bankruptcy.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
182. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
183. Bankruptcy Experts, supra note 7.
2011] 1255
17
Hucker: Hucker: Do I Own This Car
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MSSOURI LAW REVIEW
Courts may require this debtor to take a deduction of actual expenses.184 This
logic follows IRS directions with respect to its Local Standards. Specifically,
the IRS instructs the taxpayer to claim the lesser of actual expenses or the IRS
Local Standards.'8 5 Thus, requiring debtors of encumbered cars to take only
the actual expense will increase further the amount that creditors are re-
paid. 186
These results affect much more than car ownership costs. Since the en-
actment of BAPCPA, debtors commonly include deductions at the maximum
allowable amount, even if the debtor's actual expenses are lower than the
allowable amount.'87 This situation frequently occurs with respect to allowa-
ble housing expenses. For example, in In re Phillips, a Massachusetts bank-
ruptcy court held that a Chapter 13 debtor was permitted to claim the maxi-
mum allowable expense for housing costs, even though the debtor's expense
was significantly less than the allowed housing expense under IRS Local
Standards.'88 Likewise, a Florida bankruptcy court held in In re Morgan that
a debtor who had no housing payments still was entitled to claim the maxi-
mum allowable housing expense pursuant to IRS Local Standards.' 89 Conse-
quently, if the Ransom reasoning is applied to other categories of deductions,
debtors will have even more disposable income to distribute to creditors.
2. Effects on Chapter 7 Cases
Future courts likely will use the reasoning of the Ransom Court not just
in Chapter 13 cases, but in Chapter 7 cases as well. 190 Even though the
means test has a different purpose in Chapter 7 than in Chapter 13, the means
test is calculated the same way under both Chapters.191 If courts choose to
apply the Ransom reasoning to Chapter 7 filings, the effects will be drastic.
I184. Id.
185. Collection Financial Standards, supra note 107.
186. See Oral Argument, Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., at 43:21, 131 S. Ct.
716 (SC 09-907) [hereinafter Oral Argument], available at http://www.supremecourt.
gov/oralarguments/argument audio.aspx (Maynard: "In the 2007 study that U.S.
Trustees did . . . at Congress's request . . . the average overpayment of a debtor in
claiming this transportation ownership expense was $335, which is a lot when you're
talking about the standard in the chart being $471.").
187. See, e.g., In re Phillips, 382 B.R. 153, 174 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008); In re
Morgan, 374 B.R. 353, 356 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007).
188. In re Phillips, 382 B.R. at 165, 172.
189. In re Morgan, 374 B.R. at 356.
190. Bankruptcy Experts, supra note 7.
191. See 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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In 1997, Marianne Culhanel 92 and Michaela White, then professors at
Creighton Law School, studied these potential drastic effects through a grant
from the American Bankruptcy Institute Endowment.1 93 While Culhane and
White carried out this study eight years before the passage of BAPCPA in
2005, Congress had been debating essentially the same piece of legislation for
the prior ten years.19 4 Culhane and White studied a "database of over 1,000
individual [C]hapter 7 cases from seven judicial districts in seven federal
circuits across the nation."' 95 In the first study, Culhane and White calculated
the means test for these 1000 debtors by allowing the debtors the full vehicle
ownership expense deduction.196 Under this calculation, only 3.6% of debt-
ors failed the means test.197 Culhane and White next calculated the means
test for the 1000 debtors but did not include a deduction for the vehicle own-
ership expense.' Under this calculation, the number of debtors who failed
the means test almost doubled to 6.8%.199 By failing the means test in Chap-
ter 7, these debtors violated the "substantial abuse" test and were not permit-
ted to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitions.200
After reviewing the Ransom decision, Culhane concluded that the ruling
will create an increase in the number of debtors "whose petitions raise a pre-
sumption of abuse."201 Consequently, the number of people who will be able
to participate in Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings likely will decrease as a
result of the Ransom decision, especially if the Court's reasoning in Ransom
is applied to other IRS expense amounts.
3. New Standard Created for Future BAPCPA Litigation
The Ransom decision created a new standard for courts to interpret
BAPCPA's provisions. Many commentators have noted that BAPCPA is an
192. Marianne Culhane is now Dean of the University of Creighton School of
Law. Marianne B. Culhane, CREIGHTON U. SCH. L., http://www.creighton.edullaw/
faculty/culhane/index.php (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
193. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer
Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 27, 30 (1999). While this study was carried out over ten years
before the Ransom case, the legislation that Culhane and White were using was essen-
tially the same as what was eventually passed in 2005. See id at 32.
194. See id. at 30; Zywicki, supra note 82, at 2027.
195. Culhane & White, supra note 193, at 30.
196. See id at 31, 43-46.
197. Id. at 31.
198. Id. at 46.
199. Id
200. See id. at 28-29.
201. Email from Marianne Culhane, Dean, Creighton University School of Law,
to Anne B. Hucker (Mar. 3, 2011, 7:07 PM) (on file with author).
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endless source of litigation because of its ambiguous terms.202 In fact, lower
courts have been split in their rulings over countless BAPCPA provisions.
For instance, lower courts disagree over the exempt status of inherited
IRAs.203 In In re Chilton, a Texas bankruptcy court held that a debtor could
not exempt an IRA which was inherited from her mother.204 However, in
Doeling v. Nessa, the Eighth Circuit bankruptcy appellate panel departed
from the Texas bankruptcy court, holding that a debtor could exempt an IRA
205which was inherited from her father. To deal with these types of difficul-
ties of BAPCPA, future courts may well utilize Justice Kagan's three factors
to determine the meaning of the provision: (1) the text of the provision, (2)
206the context of the provision, and (3) the purposes of BAPCPA.
B. The Court's Misguided Approach
The sense that the Court got it wrong lurks beneath the apparent simplic-
ity of the Ransom decision. The Ransom Court reached its conclusion by
relying on the IRS interpretation of how to use the National and Local Stand-
ards.207 The Ransom Court held that the bankruptcy code should use the Lo-
cal Standards in the same manner that the IRS uses the Local Standards.208
This logic is flawed for two reasons.
First, the IRS states that its National and Local Standards are for tax
purposes only.209 In particular, the IRS maintains that these Standards "are
intended for use in calculating repayment of delinquent taxes. These Stand-
ards are ... for purposes of federal tax administration only."210 By inference,
the IRS asserts that the bankruptcy code should not rely on the IRS Standards
and IRS interpretation of those Standards.
Second, the legislative history of BAPCPA suggests that Congress did
not intend for the means test to rely on IRS interpretation of the National and
Local Standards. An earlier draft of BAPCPA stated that
expense allowances under the applicable National Standards, Local
Standards and Other Necessary Expenses allowance . . . for the
202. Braucher, supra note 93, at 457-58.
203. Compare In re Chilton, 426 B.R. 612, 622 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2010) (holding
that inherited IRA funds are a non-exempt asset of the debtor's bankruptcy estate),
rev'd sub nom. Chilton v. Moser, 444 B.R. 548 (E.D. Tex. 2011), with Doeling v.
Nessa, 426 B.R. 312, 315 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010) (holding that inherited IRA funds
are an exempt asset of the debtor's bankruptcy estate).
204. Chilton, 426 B.R. at 622.
205. Doeling, 426 B.R. at 315.
206. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2011).
207. Id. at 726.
208. Id.
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debtor . . . in the area in which the debtor resides as determined
under the Internal Revenue Service financial analysis for expenses
in effect as of the date of the order for relief
211
should be used in determining a debtor's allowable expenses. Ultimately,
Congress removed the "as determined under the Internal Revenue Service
financial analysis" language and inserted "applicable monthly expense
amounts."212 If Congress had intended for the bankruptcy code to adhere to
IRS interpretations of the National and Local Standards, Congress would not
have removed language from the statute instructing the bankruptcy code to
follow IRS methodology.
C. The Elephant in the Room
Most commentators have criticized BAPCPA. One observer remarked
that BAPCPA "is rife with bad draftsmanship, dumbfounding contradictions,
and curious, even comical, special interest exceptions." 213 It is hard to ad-
mire the quality of BAPCPA's draftsmanship. 2 14 Judges and scholars have
not hesitated to criticize Congress for the details of BAPCPA.21 And yet
Justice Scalia was the only member of the Supreme Court to admit the exist-
ence of these problems.2 16
In the Court's most recent bankruptcy decisions, Justice Scalia was the
217lone dissenter. Some observers believe that Chief Justice John Roberts
assigned the Ransom case to Justice Elena Kagan as her first opinion to com-
pel Justice Scalia to join the Court's decision.218 But Justice Scalia refused to
join the Court's opinion and, in doing so, brought attention to BAPCPA's
glaring flaws.
While Justice Kagan found meaning in the text, context, and purpose of
BAPCPA, the Court's opinion is badly flawed, though these flaws likely
would be present in any opinion about BAPCPA. As one commentator
wrote, Ransom is "fiction, because the text is convoluted, the context is man-
ufactured, and the purpose is presupposed." 219 In fact, Justice Kagan goes
through judicial gymnastics to find meaning in the text, context, and purpose
211. H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 101 (2d Sess. 1998).
212. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2006).
213. David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of
2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 227 (2007).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 730-31 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
217. See Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2478 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
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of BAPCPA. Notably, appellant Jason Ransom argued that while the Court
requires a debtor to incur a debt in the form of a loan or lease payment to
claim a car ownership expense, BAPCPA prohibits debts from being claimed
as expenses.220 The majority in Ransom disagreed, ruling that "any friction
between the two likely reflects only a lack of attention to how an across-the-
board exclusion of debt payment would correspond to a particular IRS allow-
ance."221 This lackluster response caused one incredulous commentator to
wonder, "[W]e're supposed to believe that 'meaning, context, and purpose'
can be found in Congressional 'lack of attention'?" 222
The lengths that Justice Kagan went to to find meaning in BAPCPA are
particularly galling, given that one of the purposes of creating BAPCPA was
223to eliminate judicial discretion. Justice Kagan seems to be trying to fix the
draftsmanship mistakes of a "hastily-designed and poorly-crafted statute."224
Perhaps the Court chose to take this route because Congress does not have
11 221
any stomach at all" to make changes to BAPCPA.
But fixing legislation is not the Court's role, and Justice Scalia deftly
pointed out that the statute remains on the books, regardless of how poorly
written it is.226 Justice Scalia was correct to note that, under his interpretation
of BAPCPA, while the Court is concerned about the "imagined horrible in
which 'a debtor entering bankruptcy might purchase for a song a junkyard
car,"' the Court's own interpretation leads to "the imagined horrible that ... a
debtor entering bankruptcy might purchase a junkyard car for a song plus a
$10 promissory note payable over several years. He would get the full own-
ership expense deduction." 227
Though Justice Breyer joined the Court's majority opinion, he echoed
Justice Scalia's concerns in oral argument. He stated:
[D]o a simple thing. It says ownership expense. You go to the
registry of motor vehicles and you say, "[I]s Smith the owner?"
And they'll tell you, yes or no. And if the answer is yes, he de-
ducts $471. Sometimes that's too little; sometimes that's too
much. But once we depart from that, we're really in a nightmare
of trying to figure out what all these things mean that were written
228for other purposes.
220. Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 728.
221. Id. at 728-29.
222. Jakubowski, supra note 9.
223. See Rabinovitz, supra note 46, at 1531.
224. Jakubowski, supra note 9.
225. Bankruptcy Experts, supra note 7.
226. Ransom, 131 S. Ct. at 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 732 (quoting id. at 729 (majority opinion)).
228. Oral Argument, supra note 186, at 38:48.
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The Court should not pretend to find meaning in something that is poorly
written. Consequently, the Court should read the plain language of the bill
and apply the law to the debtor's specific situation accordingly.
D. Scalia as Consumer Advocate?
While some commentators believe that Justice Scalia was advocating for
debtors in his dissent, he has had a weak record with regard to consumer
rights. 229 He is, however, well-known for his "textualism" jurisprudence. 230
Thus, his dissent likely is not a result of his sympathy for consumers, but
rather just exhibits his frustration with a poorly written statute. Despite Scal-
ia's probable motivations, the logical result of his dissent favors consumers.
Specifically, his dissent's logical result would recognize the reality of why
most debtors file for bankruptcy and would account for the ongoing needs of
debtors as they go through the bankruptcy process.
Most debtors who file for bankruptcy have suffered "a serious economic
shock such as a job loss or medical problem." 231 Additionally, most debtors
who file for bankruptcy are not trying to abuse the bankruptcy system.232
Therefore, a debtor would benefit from the cushion of receiving a full car
ownership expense deduction, even if that debtor had no loan or lease pay-
ment or if that debtor had a loan or lease payment that was less than the de-
duction amount. Providing a cushion is important for two reasons. First,
modifying a Chapter 13 plan is expensive and time-consuming. Thus, the
debtor is unlikely to amend her Chapter 13 plan. However, if a debtor owns
23her car outright, she likely owns an older car. Therefore, she might need to
buy a car in the next five years.234 By withholding a cushion for the debtor,
Ransom places impractical and expensive burdens on the debtor. Second,
235
only 30% of Chapter 13 plans are successful. Thus, while debtors are per-
mitted to modify their repayment plans due to a change in circumstances, life
is uncertain and complicated, and providing a cushion up front is a more real-
istic and efficient approach than modifying a repayment plan after the inevi-
table problems in ordinary life occur.236
229. See generally Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Scott, 131 S. Ct. 1 (2010); Mark
Sherman, Conservatives Limit Consumer, Rights Lawsuits, USATODAY.COM (June
25, 2011, 11:43 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/topstories/2011-06-25-3645
309660 x.htm.
230. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 885, 892 (2004).
231. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 101, at 106.
232. See id
233. See Culhane & White, supra note 193, at 45-46.
234. See id.
235. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 101, at 345.
236. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1329 (2006).
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Moreover, loan and lease payments are not the only expense in owning a
car (that are not also covered by the vehicle operating expense provided by
IRS Local Standards). Cars "depreciate in value, have a useful life, and need
to be replaced." 2 37 A vehicle ownership expense deduction would be helpful
to a debtor so that a debtor could save money to purchase a new car if needed.
Notably, the facts of the Ransom case are unique. Most debtors entering
Chapter 13 bankruptcy do not own a car that is fully paid-for, of high quality,
and relatively new.238 Instead, most debtors entering Chapter 13 own a car
239that is old and in poor condition. Consequently, many debtors may have to
purchase a new vehicle during the course of their Chapter 13 plan. Permitting
a debtor to claim a vehicle ownership expense, even if the debtor has an un-
encumbered car, would allow the debtor to purchase a new vehicle if neces-
sary.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ransom v. FIA Card
Services, N.A. marked a paradigm shift in BAPCPA litigation. The Court
provided a roadmap for future courts on how to interpret BAPCPA provi-
sions.24o Future courts will look to the text, context, and purpose of BAPCPA
241to interpret its statutory language. More specifically, the Ransom decision
will have immediate effects on the administration of the bankruptcy system.
First, debtors who own unencumbered cars will be unable to claim a vehicle
242
ownership expense; consequently, debtors will pay creditors more money.
Second, many debtors who file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy will be forced to
243
convert their petitions to Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Thus, creditors again will
be repaid more money.
Despite the tidiness of the Court's holding, Justice Scalia's dissent high-
lighted the real problems with BAPCPA. In particular, Justice Scalia ad-
dressed the poor construction and draftsmanship of the statute.244 He noted
that either under the Court's interpretation of the statute or under his interpre-
tation of the statute, odd results occur.245 Thus, these results should not de-
termine how the Court interprets the provisions of BAPCPA.
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The Court should not create meaning in a statute that is poorly written
and avoid, in yet another decision, the fundamental problems with BAPCPA.
Instead, the Court should adopt Justice Scalia's approach, interpret the statute
as it is, and let Congress fix the problems that it created.
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